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DCI/IC 75-1769

24 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Presentation at the Deputy Chiefs of Mission Seminar, 22 June 1975

25X1 1. In accordance with arrangements originally made by [] for General Wilson, I conducted a 2 1/2 hour Seminar discussion on Intelligence Community HUMINT concepts and activities at the DCM Seminar on 22 June. The Seminar members were 14 DCM-designates, all of whom are scheduled to leave for their new posts within the next 60 days (see attached list). The DCM Seminar lasts one week. It is a full-time intensive day and evening affair. The location (Cacapon State Park lodge near Berkeley Springs, West Virginia) is chosen in order to remove the FSO's from telephone and other disruptive contacts.

2. The points I covered with this group are those in my outline (also attached). This is basically the same material I use with other Foreign Service Officer groups but this one was tailored specifically for the DCM level. The session was conducted in discussion style with frequent questions as we went along. The following were among the key points of interest expressed by the Seminar members:

a. With one or two exceptions, members of the group had no understanding about the DCI's role in the Community, the background of the Intelligence Community function, or government HUMINT concepts and activities such as those of the Human Sources Committee.

b. There was strong interest in all aspects of the discussion on management of information collection and reporting at the embassy level. The overt information gathering and reporting coordination role of the Ambassador was stressed.

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c. The need for active overt collection and reporting management at the embassy appeared to be enthusiastically accepted. There was considerable discussion on this point. There appeared to be agreement that few overseas posts were well and aggressively managed in overt collection and reporting. I passed out copies of PL 93-475 which most of the officers had not seen. This is the recent legislation which reaffirms the authority of the ambassador to be informed of the activities of all agencies and personnel [redacted] In discussing this and the ambassador's information collection and reporting management responsibility, I stressed that we were dealing with the coordination of overt collection [redacted]

e. There was strong endorsement of the FOCUS assessment procedures, which were described in some detail, as a support to enhancement of national and embassy level central management of collection and reporting.

4. During informal discussion at the end of the session, two of the officers told me they would be interested in a detail assignment to the Intelligence Community Staff (I had not solicited this) during a future Washington tour.

5. After conclusion of the discussion, Mr. John Shumate, Foreign Service Institute coordinator for the Seminar, said he believed this presentation should be institutionalized as a permanent part of the DCM Seminar. I affirmed our willingness to participate in the future.

[redacted]
C/HB/ICS

Attachments:

1. List of members
2. Outline

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Distribution:

- 0 - D/DCI/IC, AD/DCI/IC, w/atts (and 1-15A) [redacted]
 1 - IC Registry, w/atts
 1 - HB/DCM Seminar, w/atts
 1 - HB/Chrono, w/atts

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DCM SEMINAR

1. Introduction to Intelligence Community Staff concept and functions.

--DCI role in management. Presidential letter of November 1971. Reaffirmed by President Ford 9 October 1974.

--Magnitude of budget and diversity of activity.

--Description of difficulties and limitations of DCI's exercise of management.

--Technical vs Human Sources Collection. Prognosis of relative values of these collection systems over next decade.

--Importance of Human Sources.

2. Foreign Affairs Community relationship to Intelligence Community.

--Note DCI has some authority/power over intel community, but not over non-intelligence agencies. Can only influence.

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--In Human Source field, Foreign Service reporting provides major input to intel process/national decision making.

But other non-intel agencies like Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, etc. also important.

--PFIAB: "Human Source capabilities and resources of the government are a national asset to be employed as a cohesive system responsive primarily to national requirements." PFIAB placed heavy emphasis on improving contribution of Foreign Service.

--Departmental vs National Intel Needs.
How to encourage departments (esp. non-intel) to be responsive to national intel needs. (KIQ-KEP process might be mentioned, but it is not part of normal mission concerns.)

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3. National level guidance for Human Source collection and reporting.

--Description of Human Sources Committee, its work. Membership includes State, Treasury, ERDA.

--National Human Source Plan concept.

--Describe FOCUS B assessments. Purpose. NIO participation. Benefits. Resulting guidance to national level agencies and embassies.

--Washington analyst/producer interface with FSO, other "info gatherers" in field. Describe chronic gap in this relationship.

Actions (in addition to FOCUS) to bridge gap:

informal feedback commo system,
secure telephone conferences,
improved orientation and training
for FSOs, Treasury Attaches, etc.

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4. Role of the Overseas Mission.

--Embassy is key foreign "information gathering" element of government.



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--Need for improved collection and reporting coordination and management at embassies.

While an accepted theoretical concept, collection management is not practiced effectively among non-intelligence elements nor between them and intel elements at many posts. It is Ambassador's responsibility, and DCM often principal action officer.

--Collection management means developing method of pooling contacts, discussing requirements, and insuring that appropriate officers develop and exploit their individual contacts to obtain data required (note recent Embassy (Moscow) suggestions re finding sources based on specific Washington requirements and requesting

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Washington specify requirements for forthcoming meetings with specific Soviet sources).

--Various methods of embassy collection management. Ambassador himself at small posts, DCM at others. In some cases by country team or committee [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Not trying to impose a specific system across board, each embassy should devise solution based on its own characteristics.

--Note new statutory (Section 16 of PL 93-475) reaffirmation of ambassador's authority to run embassy and obligation of all agencies and departments having officers in country to keep ambassador informed of their activities.

5. Roles of Individual Mission Elements.

--General: All non-State intel and other elements of the embassy receive tasking from their Washington headquarters. Ambassador and, as designated by ambassador, DCM need to know what directives

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non-State elements are operating from.



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Ambassador can't do his intel collection coordinator job without good info on missions and local activities all embassy elements.


--Foreign Service: POL and ECON Sections are key, report bulk of overt Human Source info used by Washington level analyst/producer community. POL and ECON reporting: to what national requirements is it responsive? Value of CIRL? Economic Alert List? Cherne report on EUR reporting. Ad hoc requirements from State Country Desk? Why not selective embassy solicitation of special requirements from Washington (example: in advance of impending EMBOFF meet with important host government official who might be good overt source). AMB/DCM own role in generating requirements. Need for AMB/DCM to be on top of all

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requirements and requirements sources.

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--DAO: Know DIA collection requirements system to which DAO responsive. AMB/DCM should see all info reporting. Have DATT describe requirements and his collection plan (all DATTs should have one). Get feel for what officials/elements of local society/source pools attaches move in.

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--MAAG: Note its intel reporting potential.

Some problems since reporting channels different from intel reporting channels. Should try avoid "back channel" reporting of useful intel. Can be worked out locally. No policy taboo on MAAG collecting, reporting overt info, but recognize sensitivities. Possible need for intel reporting coordination between MAAG/DAO/POL-MIL Sections.

--USIA: Note info reporting potential.

Much host country psych climate assessment data in USIA ops reports. Need to break out into info reporting. Usually FSIOs have good contacts in host government, media, hinterland, etc. Encourage memcons, other reporting from their sources. Much needs be done in Washington and field to harness USIA potential.

--AID: Points similar to above. AID officers can make info contribution.

--AG Attache: Can be key economic info reporter. Should coordinate info

collection and reporting especially

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with ECON Section.

--Treasury (Financial Attache): Only 12 posts have them so far, will be more. Financial Attache reporting value increasing. Often has unique sources in financial fraternity. Need for good collection/reporting coordination with ECON Section, assure mutual support. Some propensity to use "back channel" to Treasury Department.

--Others: Commerce, ERDA reps, Scientific Attaches, Labor Attaches, etc., all can contribute, part of collection/reporting team. Need local management for local/national info needs.

6. Conclusion.

AMB has all power he needs to do good intel gathering/reporting coordination job. Fact that many embassy elements non-State should not discourage him. Intelligence Community concentrating on methods to help AMBs be more effective in this role. Welcome suggestions on how IC can help from Washington.

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